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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk
Quite the most important decision that has been given by the United States
board of tax appeals for some time is contained in a few words in the appeal of
the Guaranty Construction Company, which was decided October third.
The decision reads as follows:

"Surplus at the beginning of any taxable year may not be reduced in
computing invested capital on account of taxes payable within the year
upon the income of the preceding taxable year."
In explanation of its opinion as to this question, the board has set forth,
among other things, the following:
“Income and profits taxes are a current annual expense as much as
taxes imposed by any state or any political subdivision thereof, not in
cluding taxes assessed against any local benefits. The fact that they are
specifically excluded from deductions allowed by the statute in determining
the taxable net income does not in the least change their character. As
annual expenses they constitute for accounting purposes charges against
the earnings of the year in which they become due and payable, and the
payment thereof can have no more effect upon the invested capital of the
year in which the payment is made than would the payment of any other
operating expense.
“ Nor is the rule different in the event that the current earnings available
at the date of payment of the tax or any installment thereof are insufficient
to meet the required payment. By express provisions of the statute, the
earnings of the current year are in no wise reflected in the current year’s
invested capital. It follows that if the expenses at any given date exceed
the income so as to show an operating deficit at that date, invested capital
is not affected.
“Section 326 (d) provides that: The invested capital for any period shall
be the average invested capital for such period . . . and it might be urged
that in the event the tax for any earlier period paid in a later year exceeded
the earnings of that year, the resultant impairment of surplus should be
reflected in invested capital for the year in which such tax became due and
payable. We believe, however, that full effect may be given to the above
quoted section without requiring such construction. Additions to cap
ital resulting from the issuance of additional capital stock for a valuable
consideration, or reductions of capital or surplus, resulting from distribu
tions to stock-holders in excess of earnings, . . . are necessarily to be taken
into consideration as bearing upon invested capital since they affect the
capital actually embarked or left in the enterprise. . . .
“ We conclude that so far as article 845 of regulations 45 and 62, promul
gated by the commissioner, require that such reduction in the invested
capital be made, such regulations are without statutory warrant and are
invalid."

It is trite to remark that if this decision is upheld by the courts, the treasury
department is going to receive a vast number of claims for refund for taxes
erroneously computed, and that a considerable number of millions of dollars
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will eventually be refunded to taxpayers. The remarkable thing about this
matter is that no one heretofore has pursued this question and had the courts
pass upon it.
Since this decision was published we have heard of a considerable number
of astute tax counselors and practitioners who raised the question and
advised their clients as long ago as 1918 to pay their taxes under protest, re
serving the right to have the depths of this question thoroughly sounded.
To those of us who considered that the commissioner’s regulations were an
integral part of the law and who were of the opinion that the federal income and
profits taxes became an enforceable lien upon the property of the taxpayer in
the year in which was earned the income upon which they were computed,
there are some regrets that this ruling was not contested.
It is pertinent to observe that in some states, at least, taxes imposed by the
state or political subdivision thereof are obligations of the year for which they
are assessed, irrespective of the year in which they become due and payable, and
it is customary among accountants to compute and set up as a liability the
portion thereof at the end of the year that has accrued but is not due and
payable until the following year.
It is most unfortunate that this question is in the course of being solved at so
late a date. Invested capital has had no general effect upon taxes since the
year 1921, and the statute of limitations will estop by far the larger number of
taxpayers from obtaining their relief under this new ruling unless some one else
will raise the question as to whether or not taxes assessed on a highly erroneous
assumption by the commissioner can not be refunded regardless of the statute
of limitations.

SUMMARY OF RECENT RULINGS
An unincorporated association which has capital divided into shares repre
sented by certificates transferrable only on the books, which manages its affairs
by directors and executive officers in the form and mode of procedure of a cor
poration, is taxable as a corporation upon its income, notwithstanding that it is
a partnership and that it can not hold title to property; its shareholders are
individually liable and it is not recognized as a legal entity. This result does
not raise any grave question of the constitutionality of the act of 1918. (Su
preme court of the United States; Burk-Waggoner Oil Association v. Hopkins,
collector.)
The loss occasioned to an American company in 1918 through sequestration
by the German government of the assets of its German subsidiary was complete
for that year and was deductible under the statute, and the fact that the tax
payer has a claim which may or may not be paid does not alter the fact that an
actual loss was sustained. (Decision of court of claims, S. S. White Dental
Mfg. Co. of Pennyslvania v. United States.)
A demurrer was sustained in a petition seeking to open up a tax transaction
closed by a compromise between the taxpayer and the commissioner. (Decision
of district court for the southern district of New York, United States v. New
York Life Insurance Company.)
A mining corporation which has paid taxes and indebtedness and borrowed
money to maintain its corporate existence and has exercised only its incidental
power of holding stock of a subsidiary which has paid the capital-stock tax, is
not liable to such tax. (Decision of district court, western district of Pennsyl
vania, The Three Forks Coal Co. v. United States.)
“Most recently accumulated undivided profits or surplus” from which dis
tributions are made under section 31 (b) of the act of 1917, include current
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earnings, and the 1917 rates apply to dividends paid in September and Decem
ber 1917, when the current earnings are sufficient. (Supreme court of the
United States, Edwards, collector, v. Archibald Douglas, et al, executors.)
In determining gain or loss of owner or lessee upon the sale of oil rights, de
pletion sustained or previously allowed for oil extracted may not be subtracted
from the cost price in determining gain or loss in 1917.
Depreciation sustained or previously allowed should not be subtracted from
the cost price in determining gain or loss in 1917.
On properties purchased prior to March 1, 1913, no taxable gain or deducti
ble loss resulted where the selling price in 1917 was less than the March 1, 1913
value thereof, but was greater than the cost. (Decision of the court of claims,
Charles A. Ludy v. United States.)
A waiver of limitations for collection of 1917 taxes executed before the enact
ment of the 1921 statute was continuing and the commissioner’s endorsed
approval after enactment constituted a consent in writing under section 230
(d) thereof.
Taxes paid the United States can not be recovered under section 3220, Revised
Statutes, without showing a valid claim therefor. (Decision of the court of
claims of the United States, Taxaway Mills, a corporation, v. United States.)
Where a taxpayer makes his returns on a cash basis, income constructively
received must be returned. (Opp. of C. W. Gallagher, B. T. A. decision 922,
docket No. 1451.)
An amount written off a creditor’s books in reducing an account receivable to
the estimated value of debtor’s assets is not deductible as a bad debt under the
acts of 1918 and 1921. (Opp. of Quadrica Mfg. Co., B. T. A. decision 928,
docket No. 2814.)
Operating deficits may not be deducted from paid-in capital in determining
the pre-war invested capital for purposes of computing war profits credit.
Operating deficits and low average net income for the pre-war period entitles
a corporation whose function is largely personal service to special assessment
under section 328, act of 1918. (Appeal of Guaranty Construction Co., B. T. A.
decision No. 933, docket Nos. 1828 and 1848.)
Three corporations whose stock was owned by the same persons were held to
be affiliated for fiscal years 1918 and 1919. (Opp. of Canton Bridge Co.,
B. T. A. decision 934, docket Nos. 2638 and 3533.)
Where a corporation owned 83.67 per cent and 63.4 per cent, respectively, of
the stock of two corporations and had power to vote substantial portions of the
remaining shares thereof, all were held affiliated under section 240 of the act of
1918. (Appeal of Baird Machine Co., B. T. A. decision 935, docket 201.)
A “ Massachusetts trust,” owning all but qualifying shares of capital stock of
three affiliated corporations using large amounts of capital in the conduct of
their business, was denied classification as a personal-service corporation. (Opp.
of Superior Service Assn., B. T. A. decision 943, docket 1002.)
The whole debt must have been ascertained to be worthless and charged off
within the taxable year to be an allowable deduction under the act of 1918, and
a partial charge-off in a previous year may not be deducted. (Opp. of Joseph
E Reid estate, B. T. A. decision 944, docket 2547.)

TREASURY RULINGS

(T. D. 3768, November 4, 1925)
Article 1008: Collection of tax by suit

Revenue Acts of 1918 and 1921

Income Tax—Revenue Acts of 1918

and

1921—Decision of Court

1. Suits by the United States—Statute of Limitations.
Section 250 (d) of the revenue act of 1918 was superseded by section 250
(d) of the revenue act of 1921, which extended the time for suit by the
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United States for federal taxes due under the revenue act of 1918 to five
years from the date the return is filed.

2. Dissolved Corporation—Liability for Federal Taxes.
Where a new corporation is organized and acquires all of the outstanding
stock of an existing corporation, taking over all of the assets of the latter
corporation without provision for the payment of federal taxes, the new
corporation is liable in a suit by the United States under the trust-fund doc
trine for taxes due and unpaid by the old corporation to the extent of the
assets acquired.
The following decision of the United States district court for the northern
district of Georgia, in the case of Capps Manufacturing Co., is published for the
information of internal-revenue officers and others concerned.

District Court of the United States for the Northern District of
Georgia. In Equity

The United States v. Capps Manufacturing Co.
[September 9, 1925]
Sibley, J.: 1. The plea of statute of limitations must be overruled. It is
founded upon section 250 (d) of the revenue act of 1918. This, however, was
superseded by section 250 (d) of the revenue act of 1921, which makes the
bar to occur only by a lapse of five years from the date the return is filed, no
limitation, apparently, being provided unless a return is actually filed. Though
the tax liability sought to be asserted here arose under the revenue act of
1918, the matter of limitation affects only the remedy, and could be, as it has
been, altered by congress. This suit was instituted within five years from the
filing of the return by Capps Manufacturing Co., the only return filed, and so
in time.
2. The tax liability asserted is really one against Capps Cotton Mills for
income tax from January 1, 1918, to June 18, 1918, which is sought to be
collected from Capps Manufacturing Co. on the ground that the latter corpora
tion, when organized on June 18, 1918, and being the sole stockholder of Capps
Cotton Mill, took over, as such stockholder, on that date, all the assets of
the latter corporation, without provision for the payment of this tax debt, and
so became liable for it to the extent of the assets so taken.
I find that Capps Cotton Mill was, prior to 1918, a corporation which owed
large debts to the First National Bank of Toccoa, secured by a pledge by
stockholders of all save 15 shares of the capital stock of Capps Cotton Mill.
The bank was in the hands of one Wilson, as receiver, who, under decree of
this court, sold all the assets of said bank, including said debts and stock of
Capps Cotton Mill, to H. H. Dean and others as trustees, who, under a written
agreement, were to raise from the assets purchased sufficient funds to pay
the purchase price for them, and were then to turn the residue over to a cor
poration to be organized, as payment for its capital stock, which was to be
issued to the stockholders of the defunct bank in proportion to their stock
holdings therein. By virtue of the control of the stock Capps Cotton Mill
was operated first by the receiver of the bank and then during 1918 by the
said purchasing trustees, one Dance being elected as its president and being
the actual manager of the manufacturing business. All through the year 1918
this business was conducted in the name of the Capps Cotton Mill and its sepa
rate books continued. Its net profits were paid out as dividends to the trustees,
the holders of the stock, and by them applied to the payment of the purchase
price of the bank’s assets. Dance, the owner of the 15 shares of cotton-mill
stock outstanding, was settled with and his stock eliminated. The new cor
poration, named Capps Manufacturing Co., was organized on June 18,1918, but
the control of Capps Cotton Mill and all the other purchased assets was not
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actually turned over to it by the trustees until January, 1919, after the pur
chase money had been all paid. No conveyance by Capps Cotton M ill of its
physical assets in settlement of the debts and stock held by the trustees and
Capps Manufacturing Co. was ever made, nor was any corporate action taken
by it in the matter. Its assets were informally taken charge of by Capps
Manufacturing Co. and the corporate activity of Capps Cotton Mill dropped
after January 1, 1919. The value of the assets so taken December 31, 1918,
exceeded the debts of Capps Cotton Mill, including the tax liability now as
serted. This appears from the income-tax return of Capps Manufacturing
Co., sheet A 16, entitled “Consolidated balance-sheet for December 31, 1918,”
where the net assets of Capps Cotton Mill, less depreciation, are put at $92,540,
and liabilities, exclusive of capital stock and undivided profits, at $53,283.67,
after elimination of a debt of $43,034 said to be due to the cotton mill by
Capps Manufacturing Co. The margin of value is thus ample to cover this
tax claim. Under these facts, I think the Capps Manufacturing Co. may be
held liable in equity for such tax as should be paid by Capps Cotton Mill.
The operations of Capps Cotton Mill were, as stated, kept for the year 1918
on its separate books, and the results fairly stated in the income-tax return
made by Capps Manufacturing Co. in 1919 for its 1918 business. The cotton
mill was profitable, but losses were sustained by Capps Manufacturing Co. in
other departments of its business almost sufficient to offset the profits. The
return made deducts this loss and tenders payment of tax on the difference
only. The United States has assessed the proportion of profit earned by the
cotton mill prior to June 18, 1918, to it as a separate corporation, and seeks to
recover, in equity, from Capps Manufacturing Co., as recipient of the corporate
assets, as aforesaid. On the facts stated, I conclude that during 1918, while
the trustees and those they represented were the owners and beneficiaries of
the business conducted by Capps Cotton Mill, it was only by virtue of their
control of the vast majority of the capital stock. The corporation was still a
going concern, though loosely conducted. If employees had been injured, their
claims would have been against the corporation, and not its stockholders. If
the business had failed, the creditors could have proceeded only against the
corporation and its separate assets. Having thus taken advantage of cor
porate organization, such burdens as separate corporate taxation must be
borne by the stockholders. No reason appears why its stockholders should be
allowed to confuse this corporate income with their other affairs any more
than other stockholders may. Even after June 18,1918, when Capps Manufac
turing Co. settled for the outstanding 15 shares of stock and became the sole
stockholder, the legal separateness of the two was unaffected. The United
States has given the benefit of grave doubt against itself in making separate
assessment only up to that date. A prorate of the annual profit as shown by
the return was assessed for this period. No other or fairer basis appears in
the evidence. The assessment thus made against Capps Cotton Mill is not
shown to be incorrect (and the presumption is in its favor), unless insufficient
expenses have been deducted. The return sheet A-11 makes a separation of
general expenses between Capps Cotton Mill and Capps Manufacturing Co.,
$15,358 being attributed to the latter and $2,821.37 to the former. By amend
ment of the answer all these items are averred to be chargeable to the cotton
mill, and there is general testimony to that effect. It is, however, not from a
witness who knew it first hand and is not satisfactory. It does seem, though,
that some of the expenses, such as office salaries charged only to Capps Manu
facturing Co., ought to be apportioned. The attorney’s fees, by far the largest
item, seem not to have been occasioned at all by the separate business of the
cotton mill and are properly charged to the other company. If defendant can
supplement its proof as to the proper incidence of the items of expense on sheet
A-11, it has leave to do so by September 20, 1925. In default thereof a decree
may be taken on these findings for the amount sued for.
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(T. D. 3775, November 21, 1925)
Section 402 (c), Regulations 37, Article 22; Regulations 63, Article 17: Nature
and time of transfer.

Estate Tax—Revenue Act of 1918—Decision of Court.

1. Estate Tax—Constitutionality—Retroactivity.

The estate tax levied by the revenue act of 1918 is not a direct tax
but is an excise tax and is constitutional, although section 402 (c) in
cludes in the gross estate transfers made prior to the passage of that
act and the revenue act of 1916.
2. Gross Estate—Transfers.
Where a decedent prior to the revenue act of 1918 conveys personal
property in trust, reserving the income to himself for life, the bene
ficiaries of the trust have only an equitable, not legal, title, and the
value of the trust property should be included in decedent’s gross es
tate, under section 402 (c) of the act.
The following decision of the United States district court for the district of
Colorado, in the case of Mary Dean Reed, as executrix, v. Howbert, collector, is
published for the information of internal-revenue officers and others concerned.
United States District Court, District of Colorado
Mary Dean Reed, as executrix of the last will and testament of Verner Zevola
Reed, deceased, plaintiff, v. F. W. Howbert, United States collector of internal
revenue, for the district of Colorado, defendant.
Memorandum
[October 3,1925]
The plaintiff, Mary Dean Reed, as executrix of the last will and testament
of Verner Z. Reed, deceased, sues the defendant, as collector of internal revenue
for Colorado, to recover an additional federal estate tax assessed against the
estate of the decedent, under what is known as the estate-tax law of 1918
(act of February 24, 1919, 40 stat., 1057). The case is here on the general
demurrer of the plaintiff to the answer, which for this discussion establishes
the following facts: That the said Verner Z. Reed conveyed to a trust com
pany in 1902 certain personal property in trust, the income to be paid to him
during his life, and thereafter the income, and ultimately the principal, to
certain named beneficiaries. Between the date of the creation of the trust and
July 10, 1916 (the date of the first estate-tax law), additional personal prop
erty was added to the trust. The trustee, pursuant to powers granted by the
trust instrument, made changes in the securities, so that at the time of Mr.
Reed’s death some of the investments had never been owned by him.
Verner Z. Reed died April 20, 1919, leaving a large separate estate. The
executors made a tax return to the collector, omitting this trust property.
The commissioner thereupon assessed an additional tax, on the ground that
the securities held in this trust at the date of his death, and valued as of that
date, should be included in his gross estate. The additional tax was paid
under protest, and plaintiff sues to recover the amount, $978,004.24.
The tax imposed by the act is a tax upon the transfer of the net estate of
the decedent. In the instant case we are concerned with part of section 402,
to wit:
“Sec. 402. That the value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be de
termined by including the value at the time of his death of all property, real
or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated . . .;
“ (c) To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at
any time made a transfer, or with respect to which he has at any time created
a trust, in contemplation of or intended to take effect in possession or enjoy
ment at or after his death (whether such transfer or trust is made or created before
or after the passage of this act).’’
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The constitutional point raised in this case is that congress can not tax
transfers intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death,
when the transfers were completed prior to the passage of the taxing act.

I
Preliminary to plaintiff’s main argument it is stated that the constitutional
questions involved may be eliminated by the adoption of a reasonable construc
tion of the statute, and accordingly it is suggested that the act be given only
a limited retroactive effect; that is, to the date when the 1916 act became
effective, to wit, September 9, 1916. The suggestion, if adopted, would avoid
the necessity of passing upon the constitutionality of the act, and take this
trust out from under its provisions.
The section of the 1918 act quoted is are-enactment of the 1916 act, with
the addition of the words, "whether such transfer or trust is made or created
before or after the passage of this act." In Shwab v. Doyle (258 U. S., 529)
(T. D. 3339 [C. B. I-2, 312]) the supreme court held that congress did not
intend this provision of the 1916 act to be retroactive—that is, applicable to
transactions consummated before its passage—but that the re-enactment of
this section in the 1918 act, with the addition of the language above quoted,
was not a construction of the earlier act as retroactive, but the expression of
a new purpose. That when congress passed the latter act it had retroactivity
in mind, and so declared it. The court, therefore, must consider the consti
tutionality of this retroactive feature.
II
It is urged that the tax was imposed upon Mr. Reed’s estate merely because
he exercised one of the attributes of the ownership of property before there
was such a law, and therefore it is a direct tax, and being unapportioned, is
unconstitutional. The arguments marshaled in support of this thesis are
very exhaustive, and unusually interesting, but based on scientific and eco
nomic theories of taxation rather than legal. The supreme court has stated
in many cases that the practical, everyday operation and incidents of taxes are
the tests to be applied when passing upon their constitutionality, and that
scientific and economic arguments such as are advanced here should not be
considered. (Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., on rehearing, 158 U. S.,
601; Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S., 41 (T. D. 129); and Greiner v. Lewellyn,
258 U. S., 384 (T. D. 3326 [C. B. I-1, 467]). In Knowlton v. Moore, supra, the
court said (pp. 82 and 83):
"These conclusions, however, lend no support to the contention that it was
decided that duties, imposts, and excises, which are not the essential equivalent
of a tax on property generally, real or personal, solely because of its ownership,
must be converted into direct taxes, because it is conceived that it would be
demonstrated by a close analysis that they could not be shifted from the person
upon whom they first fall.
"As a mere abstract, scientific, or economical problem, a particular tax
might possibly be regarded as a direct tax, when as a practical matter pertaining
to the actual operation of the tax it might quite plainly appear to be indirect.
Under such circumstances, and while varying and disputable theories might be
indulged as to the real nature of the tax, a court would not be justified, for the
purpose of invalidating the tax, in placing it in a class different from that to
which its practical results would consign it.”
Further, in New York Trust Co. v. Eisner (256 U. S., 345 (T. D. 3267) ), at
349, in construing the 1916 act, it is said:
"on the practical and historical ground that this kind of tax always has been
regarded as the antithesis of a direct tax; ‘has ever been treated as a duty or
excise, because of the particular occasion which gives rise to its levy.’”
III
The most serious attack made is that the section, in essence, is a tax upon
a past transaction—a completed transfer.
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From the statement of facts it will be observed, and must be conceded, that
when Mr. Reed created this trust in 1902, the transfer was not taxable, as there
was no statute similar to the one in question then in existence or contemplated
by congress. So in all fairness it can not be said that it was an attempt to
avoid the payment of any inheritance or legacy taxes—at least, so far as the
federal government was concerned. It may also be granted that the decedent
made an irrevocable transfer of the legal title of the corpus of the trust to the
trustee, and to that extent, at least, it had ceased to be his property.
It is urged that this transfer was complete and absolute the instant the
trust was created, and that when Mr. Reed died nothing passed from him
to the cestui qui trusts—that the life interest he had simply ceased. Further,
that the beneficiaries owned the property in question before his death, although
they did not come into the enjoyment of it until afterwards.
But let us examine this interesting contention so forcibly advanced, bearing
in mind the language of the Pollock case (157 U. S., 581), that it is the sub
stance and not the form which controls, and also the same case on rehearing
(158 U. S., 601), where the court pointed out that ownership of the products
of the farm and the rents of real estate were important in considering where
the ownership of property lay. Up to the time he created the trust Mr. Reed
was the absolute owner of the securities in question. The transfer to the
trustee, so far as it went, was irrevocable, yet it did not pass as full or com
plete a title as he had. Therefore, if the interest he transferred to the trustee
was less than what he had, a remainder or residuum of the title remained in
him.
It is clear to me that he reserved a considerable interest in the securities.
He retained, to quote again from the Pollock case, “that which gives value to
property,” the beneficial interest. He continued to enjoy the income as before
the transfer. He had a right of action against the trustee for waste, and could
assign or transfer his life interest, in whole or in part, as he might see fit. His
income therefrom was not fixed, but still subject to any fluctuations in the
dividends or interest earned by the securities the same as before the conveyance.
The question is, Did the beneficiaries have as extensive a title the day after
the trust was created as the day after Mr. Reed died? The big thing for
them, and what Mr. Reed desired to give them, was the income. This de
pended absolutely on his death. So, from a practical point of view, it can not
be said that the event of Mr. Reed’s death was of no consequence to them.
At no time did they have the legal title, and not until his death did they get
any benefits. Before his death all taxes levied against this property were
presumably paid by the trustee out of income, and thus borne by Mr. Reed.
It therefore follows that Mr. Reed at the time he created the trust did not
entirely divest himself of the full title to the property in question. The
beneficiaries by that act alone did not get all that he intended them to have
eventually; so the transaction was not fully completed until he died.
But let us assume for the sake of argument that the act does, as alleged, tax a
transfer completed before it was enacted; nevertheless, its constitutionality
is sustained by the weight of authority of the lower courts that have had
occasion to consider it.
In Shukert v. Allen, Collector, (C. C. A., eighth circuit, May 16, 1925, 6F.
(2d), 551; T. D. 3729 [bulletin IV-30, 9]), the court passed on a somewhat
similar state of facts, and under the 1918 act held that while the transfer took
effect immediately, the trust created did not take effect until after the death of
the grantor.
In Mercantile Trust Co. v. Hellmich (unreported) (T. D. 3545 [C. B. III—1,
473]), eastern district of Missouri, a spendthrift trust was created in June,
1912, by the grantor for his own benefit—the remainder to his heirs. The
grantor died in 1920. Judge Faris held that the property which came to one
of the beneficiaries came to her only upon the death of the grantor, and, there
fore, was liable for the tax imposed by subdivision c of section 402, supra.
In Cleveland Trust Co. v. Routzahn, Collector, July 1, 1925, (T. D. 3741
[bulletin IV-33, 17]), Judge Westenhaver, in the northern district of Ohio,
held that the retroactive provisions of the 1918 act did not violate the federal
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constitution. In Shwab v. Doyle (269 Fed., 321 (T. D. 3119)), the sixth circuit
held the corresponding provisions of the 1916 act to be retroactive and ap
plicable to transfers made before it took effect by those who died after, and
constitutional. This case was reversed by the supreme court, but on the other
grounds, as already stated.
Coolidge v. Nichols (district court of Massachusetts) (4 Fed. (2nd), 112),
is relied on by plaintiff, but is not in point. There the grantors, after creating
a trust somewhat similar to the instant case, assigned by a subsequent instru
ment all their interest in the trust fund, including their right to receive the
income therefrom, to the beneficiaries. This would seem to be a recognition of
the fact that the first transfer did not completely divest the grantors of the
estate conveyed. The court naturally, it seems to me, held that the two in
struments taken together constituted a completed transaction. Judge Brew
ster said it was entirely proper to measure the tax in question by the value of
the property transferred by will or by intestate laws, and that it was not
unreasonable to measure the tax also by the value of the property the decedent
had made a disposition of during his lifetime, as it partakes of the nature of a
testamentary disposition, saying:
“Whether the transmission be by will, by intestate laws, or by transfers to
take effect on or after or in contemplation of death, the transmission bears in
each case a reasonable relation to the event of death.”
And added, that after examining all the authorities, he could not say that
congress did not have authority to give retroactive effect to a law providing
an indirect tax.
Lewdlyn v. Frick, United States supreme court, May 11, 1925 (268 U. S.,
238; T. D. 3715 [C. B. IV-1, 322]), is not in point. The court did not con
sider the constitutional question, but simply held that another section, to wit
402(f), did not apply to the proceeds of insurance policies taken out by the
deceased in the name of beneficiaries prior to its passage. The insurance
money was never the property of the decedent, Frick.
The retroactive features of the 1918 act have never been passed upon directly
by the supreme court, but it has considered various features of retroactive
legislation in many cases.
In Shwab v. Doyle, supra, the supreme court discusses subdivision c of both
acts. It says that statutes are not to be construed as applying to cases arising
before their passage, unless that intention is clearly expressed. It quotes with
approval the comment of Story that retroactive laws in principle are unjust,
and that there is an absolute prohibition against them when their purpose is
punitive. In other cases where the question of retroactivity is involved the
court will exact (p. 534)—
“clearness of declaration when burdens are imposed upon completed and
remote transactions, or consequences given to them of which there could have
been no foresight or contemplation when they were designed and consum
mated.”
And (p. 535)—
“There is certainly in it no declaration of retroactivity, ‘clear, strong, and
imperative,’ which is the condition expressed in United States v. Heth (3 Cranch,
398, 413); also United States v. Burr (159 U. S., 78, 82-83). If the absence of
such determining declaration leaves to the statute a double sense, it is the com
mand of the cases that that which rejects retroactive operation must be selected.”
And for this reason alone the 1916 act was not given a retroactive construc
tion. See also Fullerton v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. (266 U. S., 435).
Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R. Co. (240 U. S., 1 (T. D. 2290)), held an
income tax was not unconstitutional because it provided for a limited retroactive
operation, and the numerous authorities there cited show that the question had
been before the court many times.
In conclusion, it may be said that the supreme court has refused to give
retroactive effect to statutes only when they are punitive, or do not comply
with the above rule of construction. It will be observed, however, that when
the act in question complies with this requirement they have never been de
clared unconstitutional.
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Admitting that plaintiff has established that the provision of the 1918 act
in question, as it affects the case at bar, is contrary to recognized principles
of taxation and economics, yet a painstaking examination of the authorities,
when examined in the light of the rule that—“Every possible presumption is
in favor of the validity of a statute, and this continues until the contrary is
shown beyond a rational doubt” (Sinking-fund cases, 99 U. S., 700)—forces the
conclusion that the unconstitutionality of the retroactive provision of the 1918
act has not been demonstrated beyond a rational doubt.
The plaintiff’s demurrer to the answer is overruled.
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